The recent parliamentary elections gave Turkey the chance for a fresh start on a blank page with the US — or vice versa. The damaged bilateral ties now have the opportunity to be replaced with a strong tie made of a composite material produced in the southeastern region of Turkey.
After World War II, during the era of Cold War polarization, Turkey was a faithful and dedicated member of the NATO alliance as well one of the US’s most dependable and effective allies in the region.
As an ally of the US Turkey was the closest to the Russian border and the only dependable regional power able to blockade the Russian lust toward the Muslim Middle East countries.
Turkey now has the most successful moderate Muslim democracy in the Middle East and within the Muslim world. Actually, it can be classified within the premier league of democracy, if compared with democracies in the remaining 196 countries.
Since the foundation of modern Turkey in the early ‘20s, Turkey has experienced a tiring journey toward democracy, sometimes happy and sometimes shaky. The 2007 elections now seem like a happy end-ing with a 10 percent margin of female deputies in Parliament – the biggest-ever percentage since the founding days of the republic.
The close US-Turkey relations and solidarity began on good terms and a solid basis right after World War II, and the line of the relations-versus-time graph maintained an escalating trend up until early 2000s. At that time the sympathy of the Turkish people towards Americans and the US government was high.
Upon getting into power, the Bush regime suddenly turned every-thing upside-down. Almost as if US-Turkey relations were capsized wittingly, the bilateral relations dramatically collapsed, and Turkish sympathy toward Americans and the US government was almost grounded.
Even more eye-catching is the fact that Turks now see the US as the single biggest threat to their nation’s security. They think that Turkey may be next after Iraq — or maybe third in line after Iran and Syria.
In March 2003, 90 percent of the Turkish public opposed the US invasion of Iraq. The Turkish Parliament, irrespective of the AK Party’s solid majority, voted down a measure that would have allowed US forces to use Turkey’s soil for a cross-border operation into Iraq. Stung by Turkey’s rejection, the Bush administration conducted the war in Iraq without regard for Turkey’s interests.
The Turkish people never supported the PKK — a Kurdish terrorist group — and cannot stand the cross-border terrorist attacks the PKK launches against Turkish civilians and the Turkish Armed Forces. This was the point where the US entered the picture and came to be perceived by the Turkish people as a threat to their nation’s security. They think that the US is conducting patronage of the PKK and Kurds in Iraq, supplying all of their weapon and ammunition needs. A US-backed, autonomous, and increasingly spoiled Kurdistan Regional Government poses an existential threat to the Turkish people. Failure to address the reality of a sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan for members of the PKK enrages even the most moderate Turks.
If a unilateral referendum on the future status of Kirkuk — a Turkish land for millennia — places it under the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government, it would be quite legitimate for Turkey to act on its threat to invade northern Iraq.
Last but not least, the White House’s strategic myopia was in full display during Turkey’s constitutional crisis in April. Turkey’s demo-crats found Washington’s silence during this turmoil to be deafening.
Although policymakers in Washington seem intent on letting an important opportunity fester until it becomes a crisis, the time is now for the US government to heal the wounds. The 60th Turkish govern-ment is made up solely of the AK Party, and it is the best time for the US to undertake a major diplomatic initiative to resuscitate US-Turkey relations.
A push in the EU, a little pat on the back in Cyprus and strong support against the PKK to stop cross-border terrorist attacks from northern Iraq would be a good cure for the wounds that are on the verge of gangrene.
The leader of the “Greek Republic of Cyprus,” Tassos Papadopou-los, played a chief role in the Greek Cypriot administration during the notorious “Dark Era” — 1964 to 1974 — in Cyprus.
“We will exterminate all the Turks” (Papadopoulos, 1964)
Following the bloody attacks by Greek Cypriot guerillas against Turkish Cypriots in 1964, Turkey declared it would carry out a military operation on Cyprus if the bloodshed did not stop. Today’s Greek Cypriot leader, Papadopoulos, was a minister at the time and sent a message to the US on behalf of the Greek Cypriot government.
In his message Papadopoulos wrote: “According to the estimations we have made, by the time the Turkish fleet arrives on the island we will within 75 minutes, in order to provide our own defense, exterminate all the Turks on the island. We possess the necessary plans and means in order to see this through.” (Greek daily Eleftherotypia, July 21, 2006 and NTV’s Web site, July 22, 2006)
Papadopoulos also made similar threats in 1967. Again in 1967 Turkey threatened to carry out a military operation on Cyprus if fight-ing didn’t cease and the 20,000 Greek soldiers did not return to Greece with Gen. Georgios Grivas, a.k.a. Digenis.
According to statements by the then Greek Land Forces com-mander during an extraordinary military council meeting, the Greek Cypriot leader suggested Turks on the island would be wiped out if Turkey followed through with an operation.
“Klerides: Akritas plan written by Papadopoulos”
Former Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Klerides stated that Papa-dopoulos had written a large part of the Akritas Plan and had always seen the Turkish Cypriots as a minority (“Glafkos Klerides — Tarihten Güncelliğe Bir Kıbrıs Yolculuğu” [Glafkos Clerides — From history to contem-porary, a journey of Cyprus] by Niazi Kızılyürek)
This acknowledgment by Klerides confirmed that, by personally going to the US Embassy in Cyprus in 1964, Papadopoulos was re-sponsible for the following notorious statement: “If Turks try to land their soldiers on the island, we have one hour and 45 minutes to erase Turks from Cyprus.”
In pointing out that the 1960 Constitution was functional and Turkey’s wish was the continued implementation of the constitution, Klerides stated that extreme nationalists from both sides were discuss-ing the issue at the time.
Klerides said: “In the 1960 Constitution all subjects apart from tax issues, one of the main subjects, were functional. A separate majority was needed for elections and municipality laws. If the tax issue had been solved the government could have functioned. The Turkish Cypriot side did not approve the increase in income tax since it would mean their paying extra. To solve this problem, it was proposed that the government undertake the education expenditures of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots accepted this solution proposal and asked for a protocol. The protocol was signed by the president, the vice president, the parliament speaker and leaders of the two communities.
“Then the Greek Cypriot side asked for a constitutional amend-ment.
The Greek Cypriots request was emotional rather than reasonable and the Greek Cypriot leadership — Archbishop Makarios III, Polikarpos Yorgacis and Tassos Papadopoulos — wanted to show the people that constitutional amendments had begun. Despite the fact that the Greek Cypriots received positive external responses on the validity of the protocol, the problem could not be resolved and the 1964 events followed.” When the Turkish Cypriots opposed constitutional amendments aimed at ending their partnership rights in the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios, Yorgacis and Papadopoulos put into effect the Akritas Plan to use brute force to deny Turkish Cypriots partnership and duties in the Cypriot government.
Problems in Cyprus did not start in 1974 but on Dec. 21, 1963.
When inter-communal talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriots started in 1968, two main ideas surfaced within the Greek Cypriot community.
One of these ideas envisaged a harsh military operation be launched to suppress the Turkish Cypriot resistance and enosis (the uniting of the island of Cyprus with the Greek mainland state) to be proclaimed after the ethnic cleansing. The other envisaged the sup-pression of the Turkish Cypriots through economic and political pres-sure within the framework of a long-term program so that enosis could be carried out.
The former was supported by senior members of the Greek Cypriot National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), which fought for the expulsion of British troops from the island, while the latter was supported by Archbishop Makarios, a ıÜüleading advocate for enosis and well aware that a military operation would be destined to end in failure due to Turkish intervention.
Makarios, on one side, intensified economic pressure on Turkish Cypriots through embargoes and sanctions and facilitated the depar-ture of Turkish Cypriots from the island. He offered free one-way airline tickets and pocket money — enough to live abroad for a period of three months without a job. His generous offer was subject to the condition of not being able to return to the island.
To strengthen his policy, Makarios instructed Glafkos Klerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiator in the inter-communal talks, to extend the period of these talks and reject all Turkish Cypriot proposals leading to an autonomous status for the Turkish Cypriots of the island. His aim was to destroy the hopes of Turkish Cypriots for a decent, peaceful life in the island, as the partner citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, and force them to emigrate elsewhere.
On the other side, those choosing military action and removing the Turkish Cypriots for enosis enlivened EOKA and founded a secret junta-assisted organization named “EOKA-B” under Greece’s control. The leader of this notorious organization was Gen. Grivas Digenis, al-though he was expelled from the island in 1967, together with the 20,000 Greek troops.
Greece’s military officers, deployed in the Greek Cyprus National Guard (Ethniki Froura) of the Greek Cypriot administration, controlled all of the EOKA-B organization.
Inter-communal talks went on and on, and nothing came out of them. There was no hope of an agreement even in the most mutual points.
The impatient EOKA-B commanders started groaning and raising their objections loudly for a better action to remove Turkish Cypriots with solid results.
The first effective action of EOKA-B was firing on a helicopter that was carrying Makarios in March 1970. The helicopter was hit but it did not cause serious damage and the helicopter was able to land. Everybody on board, including Makarios landed safely with no injures.
Right after this attack of EOKA-B, 10 senior members of the old EOKA were arrested. The interior minister of the era, Polykarpos Yor-gacis, the bright swindler and drainer of American anti-communist funds, was killed suspiciously with no trace and no suspect.
Upon these developments, Grivas returned officially to the island on Aug. 28, 1971, and took control of EOKA-B.
EOKA-B senior members and militants controlled by Grivas or-ganized the theft of arms from Greek Cypriot National Guard Army camps and organized various acts of arson.
Three prominent priests in the Sen-Sinod Assembly of the Ortho-dox Church of Cyprus refused to stand by Makarios.
Makarios, encircled partly by the priests and officers in the Greek Cyprus National Guard felt obliged to send a letter to Grivas, who started implementing the idea of Enosis to Greek Cypriots through his non-stop statements, and called on him to cooperate on Feb. 21, 1971.
Grivas rejected Makarios’s proposal.
Makarios made another statement on Oct. 29, 1971, and said, “If all the Greek governments reach an agreement, he would declare eno-sis right away without reservation. But if the stakes for success or failure are to be considered, it would be impossible to do that.”
EOKA-B wanted to overthrow Makarios so as to reach the goal of enosis goal sooner and duly intensified their acts of sabotage toward him and his regime.
In the face of increasing violence, Makarios made a statement on Jan. 31, 1973 and referred to EOKA-B as the “grave-diggers of enosis.” This triggered the end of Makarios’s regime and the Greek Cypriot Em-pire on the island.
The coup d’etat on July 15, 1974, organized by EOKA-B, incorpo-rating high-ranking Greek officers in the Greek Cyprus National Guard, with a full support of the Greek junta generals in Greece, was the end of the brainless fight of the both parties for enosis.
The politburo of the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), probably the only communist party still actively playing a strong role in politics within the Western world, recently approved the presidential candidacy of its general secretary, Dimitris Hristofias, in the presiden-tial elections scheduled for Feb. 17, 2008.
Of course this unanimous decision will strongly shake Greek Cypriot political life, and some of the good old cornerstones will inevitably be changed.
From the very first day of his candidacy declaration, Hristofias began revealing the problems and disagreements he has experienced since 2003 with Tassos Papadopoulos, the president of Greek Cypriot administration.
It seems quite obvious that Hristofias will not hesitate to reveal the secrets kept behind curtains for ages, originating from the bad governance of Papadopoulos that led the Cyprus issue to a dead end.
It seems obvious that the hotter the electoral atmosphere gets, the national values and the importance of the Greek National Council will be more grounded and relied upon.
The most interesting of all is that Papadopoulos has now been forced to declare his candidacy irrespective of his strong intention to remain uncertain until the final hour. Otherwise he will have no official or political opportunity to defend himself from the attacks of his opponents and shift his arrows towards them.
Now the number of officially declared presidential candidates is three. The possible other candidates, if any, will not be as strong as the first three — Yoannis Kasoulides, a member of the European Parliament for Cyprus; Hristofias, the general secretary of AKEL and the speaker of the Greek Cypriot parliament; and Papadopoulos, the president of the Greek Cypriot administration.
Of course Papadopoulos still has not declared his candidacy offi-cially but is behaving as if he has and allows us to assume as much.
While Papadopoulos as a candidate has the advantage of being the president in power, Hristofias has in his pocket the solid votes of AKEL — topping 38 percent — earned consistently during the past 66 years.
During the last presidential election AKEL fully supported Papa-dopoulos, but now the situation has made a complete turn in the other direction. The leftist votes, even undetermined, will not flow to Papa-dopoulos as they did in 2003.
Kasoulides stepped into the arena with the votes of the Demo-cratic Rally of Cyprus (DISY) and the Movement of Free Civilians (KEP) in his pocket.
The political bureau of the DISY decided unanimously to back Kasoulides in full, as did the KEP. If the potential votes of various po-litical organizations are added together, the total supporting him seems to be around 41 percent.
Hristofias has in his pocket 38 percent of the vote coming with AKEL.
The Democratic Party (DIKO), which accounts for about 17 percent of the vote, will certainly go to Papadopoulos.
Although it seems mathematically that the winners of the first round of the elections will be Kasoulides and Hristofias, Papadopoulos may unexpectedly reach the finish line ahead of the other candidates.
A combination of his many years of service in the National Or-ganization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) and devotion to enosis (the an-nexation of the island of Cyprus to Greece), being the brain behind the Akritas Plan (well known to Greek Cypriots and notorious to Turkish Cypriots) and his holding the power of the government in his hands may altogether possess the power to change the distribution of today’s votes during the next seven months.
If Papadopoulos’ health permits him to operate until the end of the elections, he definitely will be able to squeeze his opponents, who started their campaigns with almost 40 percent of the vote each.
It is now obvious that the some of the important political tactics of the past and secret policies concerning the future of the island will be revealed during the presidential election process.
The Greek Cypriot administration has displayed many times since 2004 its unwillingness for a new start of negotiations based on the Annan plan.
The request of the former UN secretary-general from the Greek side for a written submission of their proposals concerning some alte-rations in the plan has still not yet been responded to. In addition to this, they have declared their unwillingness on many occasions for a new start.
Foreign Minister Yiorgo Iacovou has hinted many times their re-fusal to negotiate a new plan by blocking available paths forward with requests that are impossible to implement, like the participation of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the European Union in the discussions on “the return of Varosha, the retreat of troops located on the cease-fire line and disarmament of the island” without any compromises.
It is clear that in any attempt at a solution for the troubled island before the Greek Cyprus presidential elections in February 2008 will not receive a positive response from the Greek side.
Basically, it doesn’t mean that Greek Cypriot President Papado-poulos’ policy will be abandoned if he is not elected or if his presidential term comes to an end. His administration will carry on with their general policy on the Cyprus issue, as it was unanimously agreed in the Greek Cypriot National Council consisting of all the Greek Cypriot political parties.
On the other side, to keep strong cards in hand and to build up the pressure on Turkey for further compromises on the island, it is possible that additional artificial blockades from the Greek Cypriots may take place during Turkey’s accession talks with the EU. The Greek accord will also use the opportunity to hold talks by accusing the Turkish side of irreconcilability.
But unless the international community takes measures to lift the embargo on the Turkish Cypriots and treats them as politically equal, there will be no incentive for the Greek Cypriots to seek a solution.
One of the factors that will strongly affect the progress in the Cy-prus problem is the attitude of Greece as well. The psychology of the Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, Greek and Greek Cypriot people — and their support or opposition to their own administration’s policy — will be quite influential on the shaping of progress on the Cyprus problem, after the presidential elections in southern Cyprus in February 2008.
With regards to Turkish Cypriot public opinion, their hopes and enthusiasm fired up by the opening of the borders in 2003 were wiped out by the disappointment of the 2004 referendum.
The non-realization of the promises given to remove the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC), as well as a sub-sequent lifting of the embargo, have led to mistrust of the EU. Whilst their economic prosperity is actually on the increase, the biggest prob-lem facing Turkish Cypriots nowadays is the vagueness of their future caused by the political uncertainty.
The Greek Cypriot people are rapidly moving away from the idea of living together with the Turkish Cypriots. Thus the outcome of the public opinion polls taken in Greek Cyprus in 2006 and 2007 revealed the fact that 65 percent of those aged between 18 and 24 and the ma-jority of those below 45 no longer wish to live alongside the Turkish Cypriots.
By the time this attitude spreads to both sides of the divided isl-and, this will lead to a confederal solution rather than federal.
