For most of the people, the July 22 elections in Turkey will forcibly divert the political life of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) onto a new path. It’s a correct judgment based on simple assumptions, like the saying, “If Turkey sneezes, the KKTC catches cold.”
The internal perception of estimating the results of the elections in Turkey differs when looking at them from outside. When you look at them from inside or experience them, you get focused on a specific point and what you get is the results of this region, which gradually get enlarged and cover the whole country.
When looking at them from outside, the picture is totally different. The view is clearer when not attached to a political party and not affected by sentimentality. You smell the results very close to the reality.
To me, Turkey looks like a new and strong bus of a recent design, confidently running on tough roads.
The management of the bus is handled by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the driver is the leader of this party. His seconds are his teammates.
The passengers sitting in the bus are the people of Turkey, and they are represented by the other political parties. Naturally their speakers are the leaders of these political parties.
While some of the passengers are quarreling, shouting, objecting, protesting the management and trying to pull the driver out of his seat, others are cheering the driver and giving him support. This is what the picture is when looking at the elections from inside, or while sitting in the bus.
The situation looks totally different from outside or standing on the pavement.
The situation and the disputes taking place within the bus do not reflect fully to the observers standing outside, and what they see or perceive is a shining bus of a latest model, running smoothly and safely on a rough road. The performance of the bus hits you rather than what the passengers are doing inside.
So as the elections approach, outsider observations are different than insider ones.
It seems that the AK Party is leading and again will be the winner of this election.
For ages the people who formed the silent majority of Turkey, living a life without compromising their tradition and culture, will again support the AK Party as they did in the last elections.
The Democrat Party (DP), born out of the joint venture of the True Path Party (DYP) and Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) as the new hope, suddenly fell into an awkward position with the backtracking of Erkan Mumcu, the leader of ANAVATAN. Although the DP was once considered the strongest opponent of the AK Party and the inevitable coalition partner of the new government, it is now struggling to get enough votes to cross the election threshold.
Although the Republican People’s Party (CHP) claims to be the biggest, it is true that they are the largest of the opponents only and not overall. It seems quite impossible that they will top the votes of the AK Party.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is trying very hard to pass the threshold and it is very likely that they will manage so.
This is the overall picture a fortnight before the elections.
According to the act regulating the elections, the seats in Parliament are distributed to political parties according to the votes they garner, as per the famous D’Hondt method widely used in Western countries. The votes of the small parties underneath the threshold are also conveyed and redistributed to the political parties which topped the necessary number of votes to get seats in Parliament. The system seems unfair but is the best among all.
The performance of the ruling party during the final days of the election will have a permanent effect on the destiny of elections. A cross-border operation over the Iraqi border to take control of the area widely used by the terror Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) will have a positive effect on the votes of the silent majority and the others. This fact need not to be a soothsayer. It will have the same effect on people as the 1974 intervention on Cyprus.
In the Turkish part of Cyprus, the Republican Turks’ Party-Freedom and Reform Party (CTP-ORP) coalition government is now like a lame duck. They are trying very hard to survive until the elections in Turkey. There will be a change in the KKTC government as well after the elections. No wonder there came about the famous phrase I mentioned in the beginning.
The main factors that have made Greek Cyprus unwilling to help solve the dispute on the island are international powers requiring that the roots of the problem and the responsible party be disregarded and clearing the path for Greek Cyprus’s membership to EU.
Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktaş has been characterized as intransigent, but this does not conform to reality. As a matter of fact, it was the Greek side that rejected all UN proposals for reunification of the island.
The Turkish side, while in favor of Cuellar’s “Set of Proposals” in March 1986, Boutros-Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” in 1992 and finally the Annan plan on April 24, 2004, the Greek side, beguiling the international community to the last minute, looking for support by pretending to be the underdog and supporting it until the very last moment, was always the side against a solution.
On top of that, although the current administration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) came to power on rallying cries of a solution to the Cyprus problem and EU membership, the Cyprus problem is drifting away from a solution. In this context, it is possible to line up the basic elements complicating the solution as follows.
* International recognition of Greek Cyprus, as the continuation of the 1960 Cyprus government since March 1964.
* The resolutions of UN Security Council based on this concept, which reverberated in the leading cases at the European Court of Human.
Rights:
* March 4, 1964/181: The creation of a UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus and official recognition of Greek Cyprus as the government of Cyprus.
* Nov. 18, 1983/541: Considering the declaration of the KKTC as legally invalid.
* May 13, 1984/550: Defining the formation of the KKTC as a “secessionist action” and calling for the transfer of Varosha to the administration of the UN.
* Greek Cyprus’ possession of rights and the possibility of becoming a member, to participate, vote and speak on behalf of the whole island, in international organizations.
* Alongside the conflicting benefits and arguments of both communities on the island, the involvement of regional and global powers in the Cyprus problem.
* The participation of too many international actors, topping the judicial framework of the 1960 agreement.
* The double standards of the EU by accepting Greek Cyprus as a full member irrespective of international law.
* Greek Cyprus’s position in the decision-making side on Turkey’s membership talks with the EU.
* Taking advantage of the over-willingness of Turkey to join the EU, playing the Cyprus issue as a trump card and transforming it into an EU instrument in the form of a provision.
* The belief of the Greek side that they would get the most compromise by means of threatening Turkey it will veto its EU accession process.
* Aiming to be recognized by Turkey as the legal representative of the Cypriot government by dragging the problem to the judicial organs of the EU.
* Within the short and medium term, the opening of the closed area of Varosha and the approval and exercising of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement by opening Turkish harbors and airports to Greek Cypriot traffic.
* Working to reduce the Turkish Cypriots from a politically equal community to a minority once again and invalidating the existence, rights and status of Turkey on the island.
* Importing the EU as an actor alongside the claims of the Greeks to the solution of the problem by mentioning that the resolution in Cyprus will be within the UN framework and relying on EU principles in the Turkey-EU Negotiation Framework Document and Accession Partnership Document.
* By this method, shifting the solution from the UN floor, where Turkey is a member, to a platform where the EU participates but Turkey and the KKTC do not
* The usage of Greek Cyprus by the other members of the EU who are against the membership of Turkey for other reasons as a subcontractor.
* The continuation of sanctions imposed on the KKTC and no penalty for the Greeks vis-a-vis a resolution.
* In this context, the unwillingness of Greeks to sit down for a solution.
* The extremely nationalist and racial feelings of Greeks stretching to fascism, and rejecting coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots. In addition, the increase in the supporters of neo-Nazism, far-right groups and violent EOKA-like organizations such as Hrisi Avgi/Golden Dawn.
* The role of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek Cypriot education system.
* The strong support of the Greek Cypriots for the Pappadopoulos factor, in the April 24 referendum and onwards,
* Greek Cyprus profiting significantly from international laws and propaganda against the Turkish side.
* The conveyance of property affair, which should be the part of a comprehensive and bilateral solution, to the European court by the Greek Cypriots, for a solution within the level of the rights of an individual.
* The efficacy of the Greek Cypriot and Greek lobby within Western countries and their collaboration with the Armenian lobby.
* The psychological operations conducted for years in the KKTC for a solution along the Greek Cypriot thesis.
The final position reached within this framework neither leads to a solution under a joint state due to the obstructions of the Greek Cypriots nor does it leave a gap for the recognition of the KKTC and the lifting of sanctions.
I often wonder about those who say the Cyprus problem started after the Turkish intervention in 1974. This depiction is just a fairy tale and is often used to mislead people with minimal knowledge of the issue.
I am also perplexed by those who say there are no embargoes on the Turkish Cypriots.
UN resolutions — particularly No. 541 dated Nov. 18, 1983 — re-strict all kinds of international relations for the Turkish Cypriots, from direct flights to communication, from education to cultural, in all as-pects of civilized life.
Since that date the Turkish Cypriots and their unilaterally de-clared state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC), have been considered legally invalid by UN member states, with Turkish Cypriots suffering under unjust political, economic, cultural, social, sporting and trade embargoes.
Of course this was not the first time Turkish Cypriots were squeezed by embargoes for concessions from their freedoms and lives.
From Dec. 22, 1963 to July 20, 1974 — 11 long years — Turkish Cypriots were confined to an “open-air prison” by the Greek Cyprus government headed by Makarios: They were allowed no freedom of movement, no property or education rights and no normal life. No jobs, no money, no medicine, no milk, no water and no future.
On top of this inhumane treatment, from March 1, 1965 to July 20, 1974, the following so-called “strategic materials” were also banned by the Greek Cyprus government from delivery to the open-air prison.
The following list is copied from official documents of the Greek Cyprus government, published on March 1, 1965:
“List of materials the import of which into Turkish Cypriot areas is prohibited”
The Cyprus Government has stated that the items listed below are considered to be restricted with effect 1 March 1965. The list may be changed at any time the Government of Cyprus wishes to do so. This list supersedes all previous lists issued.
Serial Item
Iron poles (angle-iron, pickets); Iron rods and thick steel plates; Timber; Crushed metal, stone, sand, gravel; Barbed wire; Wire; Ca-mouflage netting; Cables; Wire cutters; Mine detectors; Power explod-ers; Wireless sets (Police or military pattern) Domestic Radios excluded; Telephones; Cartridges for shot guns; Explosives (TNT, gelatin, dyna-mite etc.); Detonators; Sulphur; Ammonium nitrate; Steel Wool; Fuel in large quantities; Automobile spare parts; Tires; Accumulators and dry batteries; Circuit testers; Fire fighting equipment; Bags (Sacks, canvas, jute or linen types.); Boots, boot studs, leather laces; Rubber soles; Khaki cloth; Leather jackets; Gloves; Socks (Woolen and/or cotton and/or any mixture thereof. Excluding ankle socks; Mackintoshes (including plastic raincoats); Woolen materials (including knitting wool); Imported coal (type used in blacksmiths’ forge); Thermos flasks; Plastic pipes; Milk, for babies and adults.”
If you still think that the Cyprus problem began with the Turkish intervention on July 20, 1974, rest assured that it is a fantasy superior to “The Lord of the Rings.”
Cyprus’s joining the European Union has been overshadowed by the country’s unresolved political division that has existed since 1956. The island has been divided into a Turkish sector and a Greek sector as far back as 1956 under the British colonial government. First the capital Nicosia was divided by barbed wire, to be followed later by other towns and rather large villages.
The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) landed on the island after heated inter-communal clashes took place in 1964 according to UN Resolution No. 186, dated March 4, 1964, and not after the 1974 intervention. Most people think the UNFICYP was deployed on the island after the 1974 intervention. This, of course, is not the truth.
The Cyprus problem, originating from the Greek Megalo Idea dat-ing from 1796, has existed on the island since 1878.
After the lease of the island to the British by the Ottomans, Greeks of mainland Greece and the local Greeks living on the island started dreaming of “enosis” — annexation to Greece.
A colossal total of 36 proposals, plans, constitutions and solutions submitted by the British, the UN, the US and by similar powers since 1947, for a sustainable and just solution on the island were all rejected by the Greek side. The simple reason was that they all did not include a clear passage to enosis.
Only the 1960 treaties for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus were reluctantly signed by Makarios, which he was forced to put his seal on by Greece. After signing the documents, he wrote his famous sentence, “I too spoke of enosis after Zürich,” which clearly exposes his ambitions.
Greek Archbishop then President Makarios rejected the 1947 Lord Winster Plan, the 1948 Edward Jackson Constitution, the 1955 John Harding Proposals, the 1956 Lord Radcliffe Plan, the 1957 Paul Henry Spaak Plan, the 1957 Selwyn Lloyd Proposals and the 1958 Macmillan Plan, etc. Mr. Pappadopulos recently rejected the well known Annan plan, which aimed to establish the Federal Republic of Cyprus on the island.
If Makarios had said yes to any of these plans or proposals and forgotten about enosis, then there would never have been a problem on the island, which stands at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Africa and has a strong export orientation.
For most of the last 12 countries to accede to the EU on May 1, 2004 and Jan 1, 2007, membership has been very positive and benefi-cial, meaning improved economic opportunity and free movement across 27 European countries.
Ankara has grown increasingly ambivalent to a settlement de-spite its EU ambitions and the fact that Brussels has linked its appli-cation for membership to a solution of the Cyprus problem.
Dark clouds are being blown by the EU, berthed on the island of Cyprus since May 1, 2004.
Three years after the April 24, 2004 Annan plan referendum, it is now clear that the side being punished by the international community is the Turkish Cypriot side, who voted “yes,” rather than the Greek Cypriots, who rejected the peace plan.
It can be observed that the international isolation and embargo of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) and of the Turkish Cypriots is still ongoing with the hope for finding a solution to the Cy-prus problem becoming increasingly slim.
The contrary and ambitious attitude of the Greek Cypriot admin-istration, with the assurance of being a full member and sitting on the decision-making side of Turkey’s EU accession talks — currently going off track – is gradually eroding the hopes for a solution on the island.
The Greek settlers issue and the Greek soldiers are further com-plicating the Cyprus problem. The existence of 230,000 Greek settlers in the south and 5,000 soldiers from Greece, in particular, definitely have overshadowed the accession and the talks for a substantial solu-tion in the island.
However, for most Cypriots, EU accession is overshadowed by the island’s continuing division. Recent public polls held in the northern Turkish area and southern Greek area reveal the stunning fact that 45 percent of Greek Cypriots and 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots are willing to live in two separate states located side-by-side rather then together under a unilateral single state.
The prospect of joining the European Union of Cyprus is over-shadowed by the country’s unresolved political division since 1956.
The island was divided into Turkish Sector and Greek Sector as far as in 1956 by the British Colonial Government. First the capital Nicosia was divided by the barbed wires than followed by the other towns and rather big villages.
UNFICYP landed to the island after the severe inter communal clashes took place in 1964 according to UN resolution No. 186, dated March 4, 1964 and not after 1974 intervention.
Most people thinks that UNFICYP deployed in the island after the 1974 intervention. This of course is not the truth. The problem exists in the island since 1947.
Etnarh then the President Makarios, rejected the 1947 Lord Win-ster Plan, 1948 Edward Jackson Constitution, 1955 John Harding Proposals, 1956 Lord Radcliffe Plan, 1957 Paul Henry Spaak Plan, 1957 Selwyn Lloyd Proposals and 1958 Macmillan Plan only because they did not give a clear the way to Enosis, annexation with Greece.
If he had said yes to any of these plans or proposals and forget about enosis, then there would be no problem ever on the island which stands at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Africa and has a strong export orientation.
For most of the last 12 accession countries, EU membership on May 1, 2004 and Jan 1, 2007 is very positive and beneficiary. It means an improved economic opportunity and free movement across 25 Eu-ropean countries.
Ankara has grown increasingly ambivalent to a settlement despite its EU ambitions and the fact that Brussels has linked its application for membership to a solution of the Cyprus problem.
Dark clouds blown by EU, berthed on the island of Cyprus, since May 1, 2004.
After the passage of three years since the April 24, 2004 Annan plan referendum it is now clearly visible that the side punished by the international community is the Turkish Cypriots, who voted “yes,” ra-ther than the Greek Cypriots, who rejected the plan. It can be observed that the international isolation and embargo of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) and of the Turkish Cypriots is still on with hopes for finding a solution to the Cyprus problem becoming increa-singly slim.
The opposing and ambitious attitude of Greek Cypriot adminis-tration, with the assurance of being a full member and sitting on the decision-making side of Turkey’s EU accession talks — currently going off track – eroding gradually the hopes for a solution in the island.
The Greek settlers issue and the Greek mercenaries further com-plicate the Cyprus problem. Especially the existence of 230,000 Greek settlers in the south and 5,000 Greek mercenaries from Greece, defi-nitely overshadows the accession and the talks for a substantial solu-tion in the island.
However, for most Cypriots, EU accession is overshadowed by the island’s continuing division. The recent public polls held in the north and south reveals a stunning fact that 45% of Greek Cypriots and 65% of Turkish Cypriots are willing top live in two separate states located side-by-side rather then living together mixed, under a unilateral single state.
