Definitely not.
The rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) as an independent sovereign state are well defined in Articles 3 and 4 of the Montevideo Convention. Articles 3 and 4 of this convention, dated 1933, are exactly as below:
Article 3: The political existence of a state is independent of rec-ognition by other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to le-gislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the ju-risdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to International Law.
Article 4:
States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law.
When and where was this Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States held and who signed it?
It was signed in Montevideo, Uruguay, on Dec. 26, 1933 and en-tered into force on Dec. 26, 1934. Article 8 was reaffirmed by an addi-tional protocol on Dec. 23, 1936.
Bolivia alone amongst the states represented at the Seventh In-ternational Conference of American States did not sign the convention. The US, Peru and Brazil ratified the convention with reservations di-rectly attached to the document.
After Turkish Cypriots declared the KKTC — an independent state in the northern territories of Cyprus — on Nov. 15, 1983, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar immediately called the UN Security Council for an urgent and special meeting.
Having heard the statement of the foreign minister of the Greek Cypriot administration, the UN Security Council, at its 2,500th meet-ing, adopted the infamous resolution filed as UN Resolution 541 (1983) on Nov. 18, 1983.
International law is above any organization such as the UN and the EU. Neither of these organizations has the right to determine the legitimacy of an independent sovereign state. International law defines and sets out the factual existence of states and is able to determine the legal and legitimate rights of states and their relations with each other.
The EU and its member state, “The (Greek) Republic of Cyprus” cannot claim jurisdiction over the territories of the independent sove-reign KKTC state. Therefore the South can never be “the legal and legi-timate ruler of the whole of Cyprus” as stated in the Green Line Regu-lation, direct trade regulation and financial aid regulation of the EU.
Is the KKTC a pseudo state?
No, it is a real state and it exists.
The UN resolutions like 541 or 550 and EU regulations mention-ing the “(Greek) Republic of Cyprus” as the legal and legitimate ruler of the whole of Cyprus, will only contribute to the delaying of the solution of the “Cyprus problem.”
International laws of recognition may serve a purpose by providing a framework for a solution to the Cyprus problem. International law says that to overcome the Cyprus problem, a comprehensive formula crafted to meet the unique conditions on the island must be found.
Each party to the dialogue must recognize the legitimacy of the other. Without such reciprocity, productive negotiations will not take place. Immediately prior to a solution each government must extend recognition to its negotiating partner. The advantage of reciprocal rec-ognition followed by a solution is the resolution of the myriad legal problems that would arise if the lawfulness of the statutes or treaties of one of the governments was subsequently called into question.
Prior recognition as a pre-condition before a permanent solution resolves the issue and enhances the chances of success. The doctrine of recognition becomes a means of restoring good relations between the two states of the island of Cyprus
Everybody hoped that the two peoples of the island or the new partners of the Republic of Cyprus would be able to live peacefully after the declaration of the new state on Aug. 16, 1960. In a very short time it became obvious that this was not going to be possible and that the Greek Cypriots and Greece did not intend to abide by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. They did not give up their 164-year-old am-bition for “enosis,” the annexation of the island to Greece, and the Greek Cypriot leadership sought to unlawfully bring around constitu-tional changes.
In effect this would negate the “partnership” status of the Turkish Cypriots and clear the way for annexation with a Turkish minority.
The only way the Greek Cypriots could achieve their aims was to destroy the legitimate order, by the use of brute force and arms to overtake the joint state.
The “rule of law” unfortunately collapsed on the island in 1963 as a result of a ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots took the Greek Cypriots to court because the Greek Cypriots refused to obey the mandatory provision of separate munici-palities for the two communities.
The court ruled against the Greek Cypriots and as expected they ignored the court’s ruling. After this the Greeks tried to get 13 basic articles of the 1960 agreement abolished. These articles were there to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, so by removing them the Turkish Cypriots would be reduced to a minority subject under the control of the Greek Cypriots.
Christmas 1963 saw Greek Cypriot militia attack Turkish Cypriot communities and villages across the island, killing many men, women and children. Some 270 mosques, shrines and other places of worship were desecrated.
The constitution became unworkable because of the refusal on the part of the Greek Cypriots to fulfill the obligations to which they had agreed. The bi-national republic that was imagined by three treaties ceased to exist after December 1963.
The Greek Cypriot wing of the “partnership state” took over the title of “Government of Cyprus” and the Turkish Cypriots, who never accepted the seizure of power, began to set up a “Turkish administra-tion” to run their own affairs, independently.
1964 was an eventful year in the history of Cyprus. It was a year of unprecedented and accelerating military trouble between the two peoples and of intense diplomatic activity aimed at bringing the conflict to an end. For the first time United Nations troops were stationed in Cyprus and the two peoples were in effect divided with even sharper lines compared to the first one in 1958.
For the Turkish Cypriots, the next 11 years would see them hav-ing to seek survival in traumatic and violent conditions. About 30,000 Turkish Cypriots were forced out of their homes and became refugees in enclaves making up a mere 3 percent of the overall territory of Cyprus.
They lived under siege; they had no freedom of movement and were deprived of the basic necessities to survive.
The Greek Cypriots, with assistance in the form of the Greek mil-itary, once again undertook a campaign of terror by raiding and at-tacking the Turkish Cypriot quarters of various towns. This time the campaign led to the destruction of 103 Turkish Cypriot villages along with mosques and other holy places. Hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were murdered, wounded or taken hostage. Over 200 Turkish Cypriots went missing during the course of this outbreak of violence. Thousands fled the island, and those who stayed and managed to survive, were deprived of their land, their salaries and their means of livelihood and survival.
A military junta had assumed power in Greece and differences were beginning to develop between the junta and the Greek Cypriot leadership, mainly over the method of achieving annexation. Over 20,000 troops had been sent to the island with the knowledge of the Greek Cypriot leadership as part of the enosis strategy.
This worsened the situation in the island.
July 15, 1974 saw a coup d’état take place in Cyprus that was planned and executed by Greece as a shortcut to enosis. This resulted in yet a further violence and bloodshed against the Turkish Cypriot people.
Although Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee stated that Britain would guarantee the state of affairs that was set out under the 1960 Constitution, they decided to leave any action that needed to be taken to the UN troops stationed in Cyprus. Turkey on the other hand inter-vened as a guarantor power under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee.
After the intervention of Turkey an international conference be-tween Turkey, Greece and Britain was held in Geneva within a couple of days. During this conference the parties agreed that all Greek and Greek Cypriot forces would leave the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. This, however, did not happen. Showing their now customary disregard for international agreements they instead proceeded to murder almost the entire population of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves in both the north and south of the island. All this happened despite the presence of the UN forces on the island.
Only after 43 years did the Cypriot Committee on Missing Persons manage to locate the burial places and bodies of these unfortunate Turkish Cypriots.
It was declared as a result of the Geneva conference that a con-stitutional government no longer existed in Cyprus and it recognized the existence in Cyprus of two autonomous administrations — one Turkish Cypriot and the other Greek Cypriot.
1974 also saw a formal exchange of populations with the Turkish Cypriots moving to the north of the island and the Greek Cypriots moving to the south. Both sides suffered as a result of this, losing homes and possessions although an international aid program was put into action to help the Greek Cypriots but not the Turkish Cypriots.
From 1974 on, the Greek Cypriot side has continued to claim so-vereignty over the whole of the island, despite the established principle that a federation can only be built between equal partners.
The latest public poll shows that the 45 percent of the Greek Cy-priots are willing to live in separate states rather than a united Cyprus. This ratio is now over 65 percent among Turkish Cypriots.
Establishment of a Cyprus confederation between the two entities of the island and that the 1960 guarantee system should continue to be part of the confederation of Cyprus seem to be the best and the ideal solution for the island.
International terrorism came into being when terrorist activities began to be directed against diplomatic personnel protected by inter-national codes, international organizations or their representatives and against the peaceful relations bet¬ween states with international agreements; in other words, when terror began to be used to threaten more than one country or the interests of more than one country.
In the decision on international terrorism taken by the Ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe on January 24, 1974, terrorism is described as “posing a general threat to human life, freedom and security; affecting the lives of inno¬cent people unaware of the aims of the terrorist activities, and making use of unacceptable and evil me-thods.”
Meanwhile, the “European Convention on the Prevention of Ter-rorism” lays down that the offences mentioned in its first article cannot be considered political crimes or offences connected with political crimes.
The offences in question are attacks on personal freedom, on dip-lomats and on persons given international protection, together with armed attacks on individual life and existing unions.
However, the fact that some states, instead of fighting interna-tional terror, adopt a different approach tantamount to official recogni-tion of terror organizations has led to an inconsistency in practice which seriously threatens interna¬tional relations. Greece and Greek Cypriot Administration, or in another words the Hellenic world, is a good example to this concept.
The whirlwind of terror Greece tried to create in Anatolia was stopped by Turkey in 1922 by the National Liberation War and the genocide attempt in Cyprus launched by Makarios and the terrorist organisations EOKA and EOKA-B and developed by the Akritas Plan was stopped, again by Turkey, in 1974 by the Peace Operation.
The leader of the notorious Kurdish terrorist organization (PKK) Abdullah Ocalan, backed by the non stop support of Greece and Greek Cypriot Administration, conducted ruthless attacks to innocent civi-lians in Turkey from his bases in Syria and Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley as from Nov 1992. In October 1999, after Turkey very nearly went to war against Syria, Damascus backed down, closed PKK camps and expelled Ocalan. He went to Russia first and from there he moved to various countries, including Italy and Greece.
In 1998 the Turkish government requested the extradition of Öcalan from Italy, where he was located. Greece than was the only country which hugged him and wide opened the doors for his refuge.
What is certain is that in early February 1999, with no European country wanting to give him refuge, Turkey’s public enemy number one decided to fly to Greece.
Mr Ocalan enlisted the help of a retired Greek naval commander to get to Corfu.
When he landed in Corfu, the Greeks decided to take charge of matters. They knew Mr Ocalan’s presence in Greece would anger Tur-key, so the decision was made to fly him to Nairobi, Kenya.
He was finally captured in Kenya on February 15, 1999, whilst being transferred from the Greek embassy to the Nairobi international airport. He was holding a passport numbered CO15918, genuinely issued by the Greek Cypriot Administration to the name of Mavros Lazaros, with his picture on.
Historians of the late twentieth century and early twenty first century will no doubt pay much attention to the factor of terror, both within national boundaries and across them. Of course, terrorism has always existed, but it has never been so refined from the point of view of aims and methods as in our day.
And it should not be for¬gotten that states that support interna-tional terrorism in one way or another and seek to use it as a weapon of foreign po¬licy are themselves constantly in danger of being destroyed by the methods they support.
Britain won Cyprus as part of the break-up of the Ottoman Em-pire in 1914, and in 1925, it became a British Crown Colony after the approval of Turkey in Lausanne. But by then, Cypriots had had enough of being a pawn for superpowers and started agitating for in-dependence. Many Greek Cypriots wanted enosis, or unification with Greece. By 1950 the Cypriot Orthodox Church and 96 percent of Greek Cypriots voted “yes” in a referendum held for the enosis with Greece.
The Turkish Cypriots did not support the enosis idea of the Greek Cypriots and supported partition — taksim in Turkish – with a 100 percent majority.
In response to these demands of the two nations living on the isl-and, Britain proposed a new constitution, which was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots but opposed by the notorious National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) of the Greek Cypriots, who wanted enosis and nothing else. This obsession of the Greek Cypriots led the island to face different disasters in the following decades.
So began a drawn-out guerrilla struggle by the Greek Cypriot na-tionalist organization EOKA against the British and the Turkish Cy-priots, the natives of the island.
The very first Green Line, originated from the famous US Mason-Dixon Line, was drawn on a simple map by a British colonel with a green pencil in order to set down the borders of Greek sectors and Turkish sectors in the town of Lefkoşa (Nicosia), the capital of the isl-and.
So was the first division of the island, in the year 1958, a long 16 years before 1974.
In the beginning of 1960, Greek and Turkish Cypriots had just emerged from a “liberation struggle” in which they were on opposite sides. There was no university or technical schools in Cyprus, no pri-vate business partnerships between Greeks and Turks and virtually no intermarriage at all. The one institution that was shared –the trade union — had been substantially (almost entirely) torn apart by the re-cent inter-communal clashes.
In 1960, after a bloody four-year campaign marked by violence between pro-enosis Greek Cypriots and pro-partition Turkish Cypriots, Britain retained sovereignty over two military bases on the southern shores of the island. Greece, Turkey and Britain all signed a treaty guaranteeing the new republic its independence.
There was, when Cyprus achieved independence in August 1960, no Cypriot nation at all — nor much sign of one emerging — despite the common experience of British colonial rule, which had left its mark on both nations and a common affection for the nature of the island.
Did a sovereign independent Republic of Cyprus solve the dis-agreements between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots? No.
The ongoing animosity between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots actually increased after 1960. In December 1963 the Greek militia and armed forces attacked the Turkish Cypriots to im-plement the changes in the three-and-a-half-year-old constitution. Severe fighting broke out after the Turkish Cypriots rejected proposals to amend the constitution, degrading them to a minority from the partner charter.
At that time there were Turkish quarters in all the main towns, and of the villages in 1963, 114 or about 18 percent, were mixed (though this was only a third of the number 70 years before). Even in the mixed villages, however, it was possible to tell which was the Greek and which the Turkish part. Intermarriage was almost nil and was normally frowned on by both sides. There were 392 purely Greek and 123 purely Turkish villages, but typically they were to be found cheek-by-jowl with villages of the opposite community.
The 230-year-old Megalo Idea obsession of the Greek Cypriots ended up in the partition of the island, with no hope of unification for the next 50 years. Recent polls indicate that more Cypriots on both sides of the line — Turkish Cypriots in the KKTC and Greek Cypriots in southern Cyprus — favor partition than reunification.
On July 15, 1974, Reuters, The Associated Press and United Press International announced to the world a distressing event:
“The coup staged by Greek officers from Greece on Cyprus has met with success and the island’s administration has fallen into putschist hands. According to broadcasts from Nicosia Radio, which is in rebel hands, the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, has been assas-sinated.”
The same day, the Turkish Cypriot Bayrak radio broadcast to the world for the first time at 3:20 p.m., revealing that Makarios was not dead and that he had taken refuge in a part of the island where violent clashes were continuing. Thus the world learned not only that the archbishop was living but that the island was engulfed in the bloody turmoil of a civil war among Greeks.
Hundreds of Greek Cypriot supporters of Makarios were ruth-lessly killed by the Greek National Guard under the command of officers from Greece, and by members of the notorious terrorist organization the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA-B).
The bodies of the Greek Cypriots were later dumped together, with no consideration being given to whether they were dead or merely wounded, in the already-dug mass graves.
Everybody realized from the outset that the callous slaughtering of Greeks by Greeks on the island and the events endangering the so-vereignty of the Republic of Cyprus had been plotted by the military junta in Athens. Govern¬ments all over the world unhesitatingly con-demned Athens for this.
The well-known American magazine, Newsweek, reported that the CIA in Nicosia had intercepted a message from the putschists to the Athens government an hour before the coup, reading, “Operation President is underway and on schedule.”
To this Newsweek added that 100 Greek officers had been flown from Athens to Nicosia on July 14, 1974 — the night before the coup.
In a statement published by Le Nouvel Observateur, Foreign Mi-nister of the Greek Karamanlis civilian government George Mavros said, “It is clear that the Greek General Staff can prevent a coup by a telephone call, or can stop it even if it has started.”
The reason no official or private Greek source could deny that the coup was engineered by the Greek junta is that well before July 15 there had been a considerable amount of correspondence and friction between Makarios and the junta.
On July 1, 1974, only two weeks prior to the coup, Reuters gave the world the following news from Nicosia: “According to well-informed sources, Archbishop Maka¬rios, by attempting to expel 650 Greek offic-ers on duty with the National Guard, appears ready for a showdown with Greece. Archbishop Makarios’s decision to expel these officers is based on the claim that they have been plotting against the Govern-ment in the National Guard and that this organization has become a source of supply for the EOKA-B group. Maka¬rios’s decision is to be finalized today in the Council of Ministers. The Makarios administration has been the target of armed attacks by the EOKA-B organization, founded by Gen. George Grivas, and which is fighting for Enosis (union with Greece).”
This was a short summary of the true background of the 1974 events based on reliable and trustworthy press publications, eyewit-ness accounts and sworn testimonies.
The Cypriot Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) was founded 24 years ago to ascertain the fate of missing Turkish (203) and Greek (33) Cypriots who disappeared during the 1963-1964 inter-communal fighting, the 1974 coup by Greek officers and the subsequent war. Ac-cording to the documents and statements in their files, more than half of the Greek Cypriot missing persons were victims of the 1974 coup rebels and not the 1974 war, as falsely alleged by the Greek Cypriot authorities.
