Cyprus gained her sovereign independence by virtue of a consti-tution and three treaties — the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Al-liance and the Treaty of Establishment, all of which came into force on the same day — Aug. 16, 1960.
They were interrelated so that, for example, the 48 “basic articles” of the Constitution were incorporated into the Treaty of Guarantee while the two Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were in turn men-tioned to “have constitutional force” in Article 181 of the constitution.
The third treaty, the Treaty of Establishment, makes it clear that the boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus do not coincide with those of the island, in that Britain retains absolute sovereignty over two en-claves, totaling 99 square miles which contain the military bases of Ağrotur (Akrotiri) and Dikelya (Dhekelia). Britain is also given certain military rights (such as exclusive control of the Nicosia airport in the event of an emergency) on the territory of the republic.
The constitution was drawn up explicitly in terms of the two people — and was referred to subsequently by the Turkish Cypriots as a functional federation, though that expression does not actually appear.
The official languages were Greek and Turkish. The Greek and Turkish flags could be flown without any restrictions, though there was also to be a national flag.
The Greek and Turkish national holidays were to be observed.
The country was defined as “an independent and sovereign re-public with a presidential regime, the president being Greek and the vice president being Turkish elected by the Greek and Turkish com-munities of Cyprus respectively.” There were 10 ministers, seven cho-sen by the president and three by the vice president (in practice a Tur-kish Cypriot was appointed to defense). Decisions in the Council of Ministers were to be taken by absolute majority, except that either the president or the vice president had an absolute veto over decisions relating to foreign affairs, defense or internal security and a delaying one on other matters.
The legislative system was unicameral. The House of Representa-tives had 50 members: 35 Greek and 15 Turkish. This ratio was unila-terally changed to 56 Greek and 24 Turkish by Greek Cypriots without the consent of Turkish Cypriots during the “Dark Era,” namely between the years 1963-1974.
According to Article 78(2), “any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote.” This provision also applied to any change in the electoral law and the adop-tion of any law relating to the municipalities. This last question baffled the constitution makers. In five of the towns, separate Greek and Tur-kish municipalities had emerged as a consequence of the communal confrontations of 1958 and had been recognized by the British. They would now be officially established, thereby becoming the only organ of the constitution based on the idea of territorial separation, but for only four years during which the president and the vice president were supposed to decide between them whether they were to continue.
Legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the president and the vice president had the same right of veto — absolute on foreign affairs, defense and internal security, delay-ing on other matters — as in the Council of Ministers. Outside the House of Representatives there were to be elected two communal chambers, one Greek, the other Turkish, which were given separate functions not entrusted to the House. These included education, reli-gious matters, personal status, sport, culture, producer and consumer cooperatives and credit establishments. For these purposes they were entitled to impose taxes, set up courts and conduct their own relations with the Greek and Turkish governments over help with funds or with personnel.
The judicial system was headed both by the Supreme Constitu-tional Court and by the High Court of Justice, each consisting of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges, each with a neutral president (who should not be Cypriot, Greek, Turkish or British). The High Court had mainly appellate jurisdiction but could also deal with “offences against the constitution and the constitutional order.” The Supreme Constitutional Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of functions and powers between the various institutions. Either president or vice pres-ident might appeal to this court whenever he thought that a law in-cluding, specifically, the budget, would have the effect of discriminating against one of the communities. Moreover human rights were strongly protected.
A long series of guarantees against discrimination and in support of fundamental rights and liberties (Articles 6 to 35) were closely based on the appropriate European conventions. Finally, the constitution recognized the bi-communal nature of Cyprus in its arrangements for administration. The public service should approximate in all grades of its hierarchy to a 70:30 ratio. The Public Service Commission was to consist of 10 members, seven of them Greek, but a number of decisions were made dependent on the approval of at least two of the Turkish members.
There was to be a Cypriot army, 2,000 strong, of which 1,200 should be Greeks and 800 Turks, together with security forces, com-prising police and gendarmerie, also totaling 2,000, but this time with 1,400 Greeks to 600 Turks; forces stationed in parts of the republic inhabited almost totally by one community should have policemen drawn entirely from that community.
The island of Cyprus has been attempting to resolve its internal and external political associations for the past 52 years.
The roots of the Cyprus problem can be traced back to the 1950s, when Greek Cypriot and Greek aspirations to achieve enosis (the island’s union with Greece) took the form of a terrorist campaign against Turkish Cypriots as well as British colonial rule. Despite at-tempts by Greece to exploit the issue in the UN, the UN General As-sembly has not upheld Greek demands designed to achieve annexation under the guise of self-determination, but urged negotiations among the parties concerned. So when Britain gave Cyprus independence in 1960, a series of sui generis agreements had to be reached, designed to compromise the conflicting interests of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as well as Greece and Turkey. *
The “state of affairs” created in Cyprus by the international trea-ties of 1960 was one of political and sovereign equality and the equal constituent status of the two peoples. By virtue of these international treaties, limited sovereignty had been transferred by the two peoples, conjointly and in partnership, in order to establish the 1960 bi-communal Republic of Cyprus. Under the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece became gua-rantors of the new state of affairs which aimed at preventing either one of the two constituent peoples from imposing its political will over the other as well as establishing a fair balance between the two mother-lands, Turkey and Greece, vis-à-vis Cyprus.
The 1960 agreements that gave birth to the “Republic of Cyprus” were therefore firmly based on the equality of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the independence and sovereignty of the island. A bi-communal state mechanism was created with the effective participation of both sides in all organs of the joint state. Annexation and partition were expressly proscribed. The Greek Cypriots and Greece, however, regarded the establishment of a republic based on partnership as a temporary setback in their ultimate aim of uniting the island with Greece, i.e., enosis, and attempted to destroy both the internal and the external balances created by the 1960 state of affairs from the very first day they were established. The Greek Cypriots resorted to violence in December 1963 and expelled their Turkish Cypriot partners from all the government organs by force of arms, usurping the state machinery. The Turkish Cypriot people refused to bow to this illegality. Thus, years of unprecedented cruelty, bloodshed and suffering started for the Turkish Cypriot people.
During the 1963-1974 period, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were murdered by armed Greek Cypriot paramilitaries, and a quarter of the Turkish Cypriot population (some 30,000 people) were rendered home-less. Hundreds more were abducted or subjected to enforced disap-pearance, never to be seen or heard from again. Those lucky enough to survive Greek Cypriot atrocities withdrew into small enclaves, the total area of which corresponded to a mere 3 percent of the territory of Cy-prus, and led the life of a refugee, surviving only thanks to Turkish Red Crescent aid. The entire world merely watched all this as a passive spectator for a decade. The UN peacekeeping force sent to the island in 1964 was ineffective and helpless. Greece acted in violation of its treaty obligations as a guarantor power. Britain also remained indifferent to its obligations under the same status. Turkish Cypriots were relieved from this ordeal and saved from total extermination by the legitimate and timely intervention of Turkey undertaken in accordance with its treaty rights and obligations in 1974, after the Greeks had made a bloody attempt at the final takeover of Cyprus by Greece through a coup d’état organized by the junta in Athens and its collaborators in Cyprus. *
Divided by a bitter history of communal violence and reliant upon the support of Turkey and Greece for protection against one another, the two Cypriot peoples have coexisted uneasily in this fashion on the same island for nearly four-and-a-half decades.
It was only after the Turkish intervention that, for the first time after 1963, Greek Cypriot violence could be brought to an end and a serious search undertaken for a negotiated settlement. Armed UN troops guard the so-called Green Line between them. Despite decades of talks aimed at reaching a settlement for some kind of federal Cyprus and normalization of relations, internal arrangements remain unfi-nished business.
Internally, the island remains divided into two de facto states, one Turkish Cypriot (KKTC) and one Greek Cypriot (ROC), neither of which recognizes the legitimacy of the other.
With its unilateral and unlawful application for EU membership in 1990, the Greek Cypriot side added a new and crucial dimension to its efforts to frustrate negotiations and do away with parameters which had been developed through hard work over the years. The Greek Cy-priot side never concealed that it was using EU membership as a ploy for doing away with the vested rights of the Turkish Cypriot people and for destroying the balance between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in favor of Greece. The unilateral and unlawful application of the Greek Cypriot regime for EU membership was void from the beginning and cannot be binding on the Turkish Cypriots or on Cyprus as a whole. The Greek Cypriot administration has no lawful authority or right un-der the 1960 treaties to make such an application on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots or the whole of Cyprus. Consequently, the EU should not have processed it as if it were a valid application.
The two sides on the island have had no institutional links since 1963. They are living under their own respective states and governing themselves separately. These two states should be able to resolve their differences through their own free will. They should arrive at an agreement over core issues such as property, territory and security. They themselves should decide how they wish to live in the future. Attempts to impose settlement models from outside would only bring grave risks. Enforced cohabitation of the two peoples by way of formulas that do not respond to the realities of the island and thereby risk the re-emergence of ethnic strife and violence cannot be labeled as a good solution. The tragedies in the Balkans should have thought the EU and the UN to be absolutely cautious in addressing ethnic conflicts. A confederation within the European Union should now be strongly considered for a long-lasting and sustainable solution on the island.
It is now exactly 1,327 days, or three years, seven months and 17 days, since the referendum on the Annan plan, held on April 24, 2004, and still there is no peace on the island nor a sustainable solution to the Cyprus issue due to the 75 percent majority of “No” votes from the Greek Cypriots.
Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos — irrespective of his assurances to EU officials of the “Yes” votes of Greek Cypriots to open up the gates for the annexation to the EU prior to the referendum — unexpectedly changed the direction of the vote by addressing Greek Cypriots on local TV stations a few days before the referendum, oppos-ing the Annan plan and urging Greek Cypriots to vote “No” on the refe-rendum while reinforcing this with genuine tears in his eyes.
The result of the referendum was that 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Annan plan for the formation of a bi-communal, bi-zonal “United Cyprus Republic,” which meant a sus-tainable solution to the Cyprus problem, and 75 percent of the Greek Cypriots voted against.
What if the Greek Cypriots had voted in favor of the Annan plan in the 2004 referendum?
1. The bi-zonal, bi-communal “United Cyprus Republic” would have been officially declared and internationally recognized.
2. In June 13, 2004, the members of the federal parliament, senators representing the people and the members of the European Parlia-ment from both founding states would have been elected.
3. The federal parliament would be formed.
4. Four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots with full voting rights, together with two Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot without voting rights, would form the federal presidential council.
5. The president of the “United Cyprus Republic” would be the Greek Cypriot member of the presidential cabinet until June 2, 2008, the last day of the fifth alternation period, comprising 300 days each. Alternatively, in each odd-numbered period, a Greek Cypriot mem-ber of the presidential cabinet would become president and a Tur-kish Cypriot would take the post in each even-numbered period.
6. The disposition of immovable property would have already been started, and the Turkish Cypriot founding state would have handed over at least 25 villages to the Greek Cypriot founding state in the areas agreed and defined in the Annan plan.
7. Some 25,000 Greek Cypriots would have vacated their pre-1974-owned condominiums and the progressive return of a further 60,000 Greek Cypriots choosing to live in the territories of the Tur-kish Cypriot founding state would be completed. A total of 85,000 Greek Cypriots would now be residing in the north.
8. Turkish visitors from Turkey would need an EU entry visa to visit Cyprus.
9. Some 36,500 Turkish troops would already have left the island ac-cording to the “Progressive Return Plan” as defined in the plan, and the remaining troops would need permission to leave from the UN.
10. The Greek Cypriot pre-1974 land owners would have regained pos-session of one-third of their lands before the end of 2008.
11. The Greek Cypriot pre-1974 land owners would start receiving monetary compensation for the remaining two-thirds of their lands at the beginning of 2009.
12. An “autonomous Greek Cypriot region” consisting of four villages on the Karpaz Peninsula would already be established and all the pre-1974 residents of these villages and their descendants would be living there under their own rule.
13. Demilitarization of both founding states would be completed and the local armed forces of both states, the Greek National Guards and Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), would be demobilized.
14. Some 12,000 Turkish Cypriot civil servants would lose their jobs due to the adaptation of EU rules and regulations.
15. Greek Cypriot bureaucrats would be occupying all the higher offices in the government structure of the United Cyprus Republic, until the necessary training of the Turkish Cypriots was fully completed, taking a minimum of four years.
16. The most important offices in civil aviation, airports, the central bank, land registry, telecommunications, customs, immigration, coast guard and maritime would be administered by the federal government, in which almost 90 percent of the high level bureau-crats would be Greek Cypriots.
These are only some of the benefits the Greek Cypriots would have received if they had voted “Yes” on the referendum. Unfortunately the 1796 “Megalo Idea” of the Hellenic world caused Papadopoulos to dream of establishing a “Unitary Greek State” in Cyprus since 1960 and accordingly led him to reject all proposals paving the way to a sus-tainable peace in Cyprus.
Either UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon himself took the new initiative on the Cyprus issue into his own hands, or somebody dropped it there.
The developments that took place this week regarding the Cyprus issue were all quite unexpected. Ban’s report, the Babacan-Bakoyannis agreement and British Minister of State for Europe Jim Murphy’s statements all hint at the new policy of the world’s political giants on the Cyprus issue. If you happen to know the political alphabet and understand political language, then you can easily understand what is cooking in the kitchen of politics.
It seems that the giants of politics did not forget the opposition of the Greek Cypriots in 2004’s referendum or the “political lie” told by Tassos Papadopoulos, the president of the Greek Cypriot administra-tion. During the Annan plan negotiations the strategy of the giants of politics was based entirely upon overcoming the problem of the opposi-tion of the Turkish Cypriots, due to the false promise given by Papado-poulos, who had guaranteed the support of the Greek Cypriots.
Unexpectedly, Mr. Papadopoulos ruined the operation by ad-dressing Greek Cypriots on all the local TV channels a couple of days before the referendum, opposing the Annan plan and urging Greek Cypriots to vote “No” on the referendum, backed up by the genuine tears in his eyes.
Since 1955, the Cyprus problem has been harming global political relations. It seems that the giants of politics have once again decided to solve the Cyprus problem, aiming for a solution in 2008. This time it is quite obvious that all the necessary measures have already been taken against the dirty political tricks of Mr. Papadopoulos aimed at destroying the road towards a sustainable and fair solution to the Cyprus problem. Preparations to start a new round of negotiations towards a settlement of the Cyprus issue have already begun.
The first step was taken by Ban, with a message sent to the Greek Cypriots in a language they understand. The inhuman embargoes will be lifted from the Turkish Cypriots and the economy of the north will be placed on the same level as the south. If the Greek Cypriots once again block the road towards a solution and insist on keeping the false title of “the only recognized government of Cyprus,” the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) — or the Turkish Cypriots as an independent entity — will be annexed to the EU.
A supportive step towards this strategy was taken by the British weeks before in a strategic partnership document signed between Tur-key and the UK. The document includes a reference to northern Cyprus as the KKTC and mentions continued help for KKTC authorities and universities in their attempts to engage with the Bologna process.
British officials stressed in their statement their support for re-ducing the isolation of northern Cyprus and for working towards that end in the EU. Efforts at direct trade with KKTC and possible direct flights from the UK to northern Cyprus’s Ercan Airport may also be initiated if the Greek Cypriots keep blocking the negotiations towards a sustainable solution in the Cyprus issue.
If the political process towards solving the Cyprus problem is blocked by the Greek Cypriots from advancing as planned by the giants of politics, the consequence would be to raise the political level of the Turkish Cypriots to the same level as the Greek Cypriots.
The elimination of presidential candidate Mr. Papadopoulos and his permanent removal from Greek Cypriot politics is also on the agenda. It seems that he will not be allowed to be re-elected as presi-dent of the Greek Cypriot administration a second time. Every possible precaution will be put into effect to block his way to the presidency. Papadopoulos’ efforts and tears on screen to build up “No” votes during the April 24, 2004 referendum irrespective of his phony assurance of the “Yes” votes to open up the gates for the annexation to the EU, seem now to have helped dig his grave.
The contents of Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos’ speech to the UN Gen-eral Assembly on Dec. 18, 2005, and an interview published in the weekly French magazine L’Express dated May 4, 2006 clearly reveal the real target and vision of the Greek Cypriot leader.
Papadopoulos stated his vision for the future, the solution of the Cyprus problem through the absorption of Turkish Cypriots into a Greek Cypriot state, at the UN General Assembly. And in his interview in L’Express, he clearly defined his goal of establishing a unitary state run by the Greek majority: “We reject a state constituted of two distinct zones and two differing communities while the Greeks are 82 percent of the population. I cannot accept a system allowing a blockage to the validity and smooth running of a unitary state. All the new propositions should take this reality into consideration.”
This means leaving aside the “bizonal, bicommunal federal sys-tem” agreed on in the 1975 and 1977-79 summit agreements that all subsequent negotiations were built on. For the past 43 years, the Greek government of Cyprus has monopolized the false title of the “only recognized government of Cyprus.”
Although at a Sept. 5, 2007, summit Papadopoulos rejected Tur-kish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat’s proposal to establish the necessary committees mentioned in the Gambari agreement and to set up a program to settle the Cyprus issue as stated in the summit agreements by the end of 2008, the UN, the EU, the US and Turkey are sympathetic toward this proposal.
For years Papadopoulos used all kinds of trickery, lies and mi-srepresentation to take the Cyprus problem off the UN agenda and to place it with the EU in the hope that he could use the EU for the benefit of the Greek Cypriots during Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. Turkey, which was previously only in the screening process, started actual negotiations with the EU as of June 12, 2006. But the member-ship negotiations turned out to be a “psychological torture process,” with Turkey being treated quite differently than other countries that underwent the accession process.
The EU’s policy of changing the core of the Cyprus problem into a condition of her talks with Turkey has caused frustration in Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said, “Unless the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) is stopped, whether it will cause a breakdown in the talks or not, there will be no steps backwards on the airports, the seaports or on the additional protocol.” This hints at a dead end in the near future for the accession talks as well as the Cyprus issue.
When looking at the situation from the other side, it is clear that the Cyprus problem need to be solved to carry on the with the EU talks. Kofi Annan, the former secretary general of the UN, pointed out, “The membership of the Greek Cypriot administration in the EU further complicated the UN’s efforts for a solution.”
The problem is not only the rejection of the Annan plan on Apr. 24, 2004 or the insistence on new conditions before sitting down for negotiations. It is the rejection of all the parameters set by the UN Se-curity Council, to overthrow all the possibilities leading to a Federal Solution and to pave the road towards a “unitary Greek Cypriot repub-lic.”
There is no solution in the minds of Mr. Papadopoulos, or the rest of the Greek Cypriot politicians, built on a “federal system” formed by politically equal Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot states.
